This paper does challenge the "regulatory license" view that reliance by regulators on the output of rating agencies in the 1930s "caused" the agencies to become a central part of the fabric of the US financial system. We argue that long before the 1930s, courts began using ratings as financial community produced norms of prudence. This created "a legal license" problem, very analogous to the "regulatory license" problem and gave rise to conflicts of interest not unlike those that have been discussed in the context of the subprime crisis. Rating agencies may have had a responsibility in the Great Depression of the 1930s.
There does exist a widespread view about rating agencies, first proposed by Harold (1938) .
It is that some sort of revolution occurred during the 1930s in social uses of ratings. It would have come, initially, in a rather technical way when on September 11, 1931, the Comptroller of the Currency William Pole (the man in charge of supervising banks with a federal charter or "national banks") announced that its bank inspectors started relying on ratings in order to assess the solidity of a bank's balance sheet. 1 The new rule permitted to favor certain securities considered as safe by marking them down at their face value, rather than at their actual market price: In a context of plummeting asset prices (this is happening at the end of the horrendous Summer 1931 which has seen bank collapses all over the world) this was a significant move. More importantly, the "favored securities" included US Government, State and Municipal bonds as well as all bonds enjoying any of the "first four ratings by statistical corporations" as the likes of Moody's and Standard Statistics were known. 2 By contrast, securities with lower grades from same corporations were booked at market price. This is how ratings made their début in regulation.
This move, according to Harold, was a first step in a succession of far-reaching arrangements that ingrained ratings in the fabric of the US financial system. Indeed, following the Banking Act of 1933 and introduction of deposit insurance, ratings became tools to monitor the quality of banks' portfolios and essentially supervise them (Harold 1938) . Both critics and supporters or insiders of rating agencies agree with this notion of a series of epochmaking decisions during the 1930s to which the modern financial system would be heir. A Moody's Investors Service memorandum traces the origins of the modern cut-off between "investment grade" (the four top notches mentioned in the Pole ruling) and "speculative grade" (those below) to the announcement of September 11, 1931 (Fons 2004 . Likewise, according to Frank Partnoy (1999 Partnoy ( , 2006 , an outspoken critic of the role of the agencies in the subprime crisis, the regulatory moves initiated in 1931 opened the door to conflicts of interests. 3 Thanks to these moves, the agencies would have now controlled the marketability of securities, something he calls a "regulatory license." This created conflicts of interest since 3 rating agencies would derive revenues from certifying that individual securities be proper fodder for safety hungry institutional investors. This enormous power would have held the promise of a disaster when in the 2000s rating agencies succumbed to the temptation of rating the new subprime securities they hardly understood. In other words, according to the regulatory license view, transformations in the social uses of rating in the 1930s would have been the original sin that eventually caused the subprime crisis and the corollary is that extirpation of rating is the first stage in the road to financial safety.
But in fact, surprising as it may sound, this reading of the crisis is also endorsed by rating agencies such as Moody's, whose officials have recently emphasized that they long for the more rapid removal of the regulatory license (because it would clarify their responsibility, they claim). 4 The more recent debate has exhibited a most curious twist, whereby rating agencies advocate removal of reference to their grades for regulatory purposes while reports accumulate on the difficulty of excising rating from regulatory frameworks and prudential supervision. 5 It looks as if our societies have become addict to ratings, enabling providers of rating to be comfortable with the prospect of an ostensible reduction of their role -as if they knew better. And if this metaphor was to be continued, the rating agencies would be like the drug dealer, insisting that substances should be absorbed at the consumers' risks.
To understand the logic at work, it is important to take a harder, closer look at the rise of rating, something that is missing in previous accounts by economic historians or legal scholars. This paper makes a contribution by providing a novel perspective on the rise of rating as a regulatory tool. 6 We suggest that, before regulatory reliance on rating was acted by US authorities there already existed a similar mechanism at work, which may be called by analogy to Partnoy, "legal license." As we proceed to argue, the regulatory license built on the legal license, which the agencies had received long before 1931 and a case could in fact be constructed that, at the heart of the speculative mechanics of the 1920s was something very similar to the process that has been observed more recently. To be clear, both banks who originated the products and those who distributed them were, already in the 1920s, highly dependent on the decisions of rating agencies for they benefited from ratings being generous (as they would be able to sell more products without facing liability risks).
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To show this, we examine systematically the population of reports from court cases quoting the statistical corporations and provide empirical evidence of a legal license in the increasing incidence of courts' quotations of the agencies' output in truth discovery, damages assessment etc., as well as in the connotations of the language used in opinions rendered during the period 1900-1940. This trend began before the 1930s. 7 In fact, by the time Pole issued his "landmark" ruling, concepts of financial prudence had already made their way in US courts, which relied on the output of the statistical organizations to assess the behavior of trustees, bankers and brokers. As a result, the regulatory moves of the 1930s were significant in that they replaced court-enforced assessments by law making, regulation and regulatory agencies, not by placing the output of the agencies at the center of the US financial system, for it was already there.
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I. US Courts and Statistical Agencies' Output 1900-1940
In this section, we examine a population of cases found to have quoted at least one relevant As one referee rightly emphasized, our argument in fact carries weight beyond the historical period studied here. Indeed, regulatory license can't explain an appreciable amount of the modern use of ratings-such as a number of ratings that are produced beyond those required or encouraged by regulation. 9 The use of ratings in legal decisions is briefly mentioned in Harold (1938) who gives a couple of cases. 10 The form of the query was " Moody's" & da(aft 1900 Moody's" & da(aft & bef 1940 v Poor et al., 141 A.D. 743, 126 N.Y.S. 926, (1910) ).
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need not add up to the total of cases quoting a least one agency). Fitch had to be dropped from the analysis because almost all the many cases retrieved were unrelated to the rating agency.
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There was a total of 42 cases quoting at least one agency. Evolution is summarized on Figure 1 , which shows the rise in the incidence of court references to statistical organizations. 13 Obviously, not only was the relevance of rating agencies for court decisions a phenomenon already present in the 1900s, but it can be argued that the take-off occurred in the 1920s, before rating became embedded in regulation.
Relative reliance on different organizations is another interesting matter to examine. 
II. Relying on Rating Agencies
The occasions for relying on the statistical organizations' output were varied. The "output" that features in the court reports included chiefly the manual (which described and rated the securities) but also, when it existed as a separate product, the price list. Claiming misrepresentation on behalf of the broker (who had mentioned a dividend that could be as high as 50 percent) the plaintiff asked reimbursement. In the hearing before the Superior Court of New Haven County the plaintiff produced as witness one R.S. Bradley, a banker, who "testified that (…) he examined Moody's Current Rating Book as to the stock" 29 and this is how he could see that the stock was worthless.
III. Moody's Manuals as Farmer's Almanac
From poring through these cases, it appears that courts used the products of statistical organizations as both reliable fact establishing outlets and providers of significant opinion.
23 Green v Crapo, 181 Mass. 55, 62 N.E. 956 (1902) . 24 Ibid. 25 Ibid. 26 Ibid. 27 In re Detre's Estate, 273 Pa. 341, 117 A. 54, (1922) . 28 Henry v Kopf, 104 conn. 73, 131 A. 412 (1925) . 29 Ibid.
8 Indeed, the language of more than one court report construes the various products of early rating agencies as representative of "established opinion." Poor's Manual, was a "well known publication of railroad statistics" (1901), 30 an "authority upon the amount and value of the stocks and bonds" (1907), 31 was "testified an authoritative treatise on the subject it. In ordering the retrial, the Supreme Court pointed to the exclusion of evidence. In its decision it commented that the reports such as that of Moody's, "based upon a general survey of the whole market, and (…) constantly (…) acted upon by dealers" are "far more satisfactory and reliable than individual entries, or individual sales or inquiries" and concluded that "courts would justly be the subject of ridicule, if they should deliberately shut their eyes to the sources of information which the rest of the world relies upon, and demand evidence of a less certain and satisfactory character." 45 According to this interpretation, the manuals entered into courts the way the Farmer's Almanac did: as a natural and legitimate instrument to tell the financial weather -an instrument which courts would have been ridiculous not to use liberally. There is no doubt that this interpretation is particularly plausible when the most "technical" output (such as pricing) were used. In such cases, the agencies were not that different from the Farmer's Almanac, telling people whether it had been a warm or a cool day.
IV. The Rise of Legal License
Thus one aspect of the growing reliance of ratings has to do with their merit as technical sources of information. On the other hand, the language found in a number of cases 10 interpretation of the growing use of courts' reliance on ratings agencies -one whereby the enforcement by courts of rating opinions conferred the agencies a genuine legal license.
Indeed, if one looks at the language used in courts when the legitimacy of the agencies' output is discussed, one finds that, in all cases where motivations for the use of an agency's manual are stated, no direct endorsement by the court is offered but instead, it is said that the manuals or agency's output represent a kind of benchmark conventionally accepted by the banking and security's trading profession.
To quote just a few excerpts in a long list of supporting statements: In 1920 a discussion of the contents of one Moody's manual is followed by the inference that through the statements made in the manual certain properties of the security become apparent to "financiers and declared that "all of the banks admittedly subscribed" to "Moody's and other statistical manuals." 51 In other words the point is that the courts were striving to rely on the financial industry's own recognized standards. This amounts to the sanctioning of a form of selfregulation (a mechanism that is substantially similar to the mechanism that has been said to be at the heart of the subprime crisis).
We suggest interpreting this ruling strategy as stemming from the "prudent man principle", which, according to previous writers, was forged in the US by Harvard College v. Amory Langbein (1996) . 54 This differed from the use of legal lists as was done in Britain, where Chancellors developed restricted lists of "proper" trust investments. Initially limited to first mortgages and (British) government bonds, the list was expanded in 1859 to East India Company stock (after the British Government took over India thus making East India a British stock), and subsequently to Colonial Bonds (Colonial Stock Act of 1900). Following decolonization, the statute was amended in 1961 to allow trustees to invest in equities. 55 For instance an opinion from the Orphan Court, quoted in In re Detre's Estate, 273 Pa. 341, 117 A. 54, (1922) , stated that some Georgia Railway bonds "while not of the highest grade, were such as were purchased by conservative investors, and considering that this trust was not limited to legal investments, and the beneficiaries were anxious to get a return of 5 per cent., were a proper in-vestment for this estate. Had interest rates remained the same these bonds would probably be convertible today without loss", etc. On the use of "investment grade" in a fairly early time, one can quote In re Winburn's Will, 140 Misc. 18, 249 N.Y.S. 758 (1931) where it is said: "The AA rating is a high investment rating and given to few common stocks. It indicates a dominant position in the industry, tremendous earning power, and ample cash resources. The rating of A comes in the investment group, but to a lesser degree. B is the rating applied to the stocks of companies, which give the expectation of a regular dividend payment. BA is given to a common stock when the company has shown definite progress in its line, has built up reasonable equities for its securities, and has shown a reasonable ability to continue dividend payments. There is a distinction between seasoned securities of the character here involved and investments in speculative securities, etc." Contrast with Fons (2004) who claims: "Thus, it appears that the term investment grade arose through market convention and then regulatory appropriation." 56 In re McDowell et al. 102 Misc. 275, 169 N.Y.S. 853, (1918 57 But what exactly the courts thought is irrelevant. In the above quotes, we are always dealing with the claim that ratings are routinely used and processed by myriad financiers and thus somehow "aggregate" the financial industry standards. Such standards can then be used to gauge an individual's behavior. Now, suppose that there existed a loophole in the way ratings were being produced (too high a grade for a certain type of product that would be really "crap"). Then intermediaries would have been tempted to nonetheless distribute such "crap" as they would not have faced ex post liability -a mechanism similar to the posited logic of the "regulatory license".
Indirect evidence that is relevant to this view can be gleaned from John Moody's own memoir (The long road home). This book does provide a discussion of two interesting episodes taking place in the early 20 th century. 58 They are interesting, because they underscore the existence of an early form of modern conflicts of interest.
In one episode, Moody would have been contacted by the lawyers of one prominent corporation (as one of the "largest industrial corporations in the United States"), which had hired the "best legal talent in America" to fight what appears to have been an anti-trust lawsuit. They invited him in a room where he was surrounded by a "dozen lawyers" who wanted him to "certify the correctness of the figures" 59 produced by the said company. The figures intended to show that other firms that had not been sued "had been even more guilty of gouging the public." As Moody states, "the certification of an outsider would of course carry more weight with the court than any unsupported statements presented by the defendant itself."
60
In the other instance Moody was approached by representatives of the "public interest" or buy-side. The context was that of the public inquiry into the "Money Trust" and he claims that individuals who pushed the inquiry such as Senator Robert M. LaFollette and also the 57 Liggett Co. et al .v Lee, et al., 288 U.S. 517, 53 S.Ct. 481 (1933) . In the same case, Brandeis also referred to the 1932 edition of Moody's Industrial Securities. 58 This was when, after a successful start, John Moody had been bankrupted by investments made before the 1907 crisis. At that point, Moody had sold out his previous franchise and restarted a new business and manual, which he meant to be more sophisticate than the previous one (this was when he began to combine his reports with the supply of grades). 59 Moody (1935) As Moody confesses, in both cases the "temptation" was there, especially in the anti-trust case where lawyers for the big firm would have declared that they would "make it worth [his] while to do this." Pointing to the reasons why, after playing with the idea for "one afternoon,"
he decided against it, he suggests moral imperatives ("I was struggling to preserve my honor and integrity in the business world") and long run unsustainability ("Once started, there would be no stoppage; I would continue to follow this downward path. I might grow quickly rich, as there would be a myriad of such opportunities ahead, I well knew. But I also knew that I would have to continue to live with myself. And I turned it down."). 62 In other words, the kind of temptation John Moody acknowledges having experienced is very similar in essence to its modern avatar in the subprime crisis, and this is suggestive. 63 In summary, the analysis underscores that, early on, the agencies controlled a veto point, in delegation of the US court system, that this veto point was valuable and that as a result conflicts of interest were just around the corner.
VI. Legal License and Conflicts of Interest: Evidence from Moody' Balance Sheet
If a license is valuable and if agencies enjoyed a legal license, then one would expect them to be tremendously profitable before the interwar market crash. Indeed, all the intermediaries who were concerned about demonstrating good behavior (banks, trustees, etc.) during the phase of euphoria in the 1920s, would purchase the manuals (so that would be able to tell the judges they did) and this would boost Moody's profits. In other words, the strong procyclicality that has been observed for the profitability of rating agencies during the 2000s 61 Moody (1935) , 161-2. See above Liggett Co. et al. v Lee, et al., 288 U.S. 517, 53 S.Ct. 481 (1933) , for an illustration of Brandeis interest for Moody's work. 62 Moody's (1935) In summary, we are struck by the fact that conventional arguments about regulatory license and the great subprime disaster appear to neglect the fact that agencies' conflicts of interest are not new. This paper suggests one reason for this: Namely, that before the regulatory 16 license there was a legal license. 68 This urges us to both scapegoat less the rating agencies' regulatory license when we observe it and to be less comfortable when we don't.
VII. Regulatory and Legal License in Historical Perspective
Upon reflection, finding that regulatory license was heir to legal license may not be so surprising (but one would have liked this to be a more prominent part of the recent debate over rating agencies and their regulation). An important tradition of scholarship in law and economics has discussed the reasons for choice between common law and regulatory law as proper instruments to enforce rights (Shavell 1984 , Posner 1998 . Other scholars have discussed aspects of the historical transition from common law to regulatory law, which they have associated with the Progressive and/or New Deal Era (Landis 1938, Glaeser and Shleifer 2003) . Our evidence suggests a similar process in the realm of ratings. Rather than regulators suddenly reaching out for (ill-conceived) ratings we have emphasized the existence of a seamless transition between court arbitration and regulatory arrangements.
A good illustration of this transition is provided the way early state statutes adopted after 1911 and ostensibly designed to protect investors against fraudulent schemes ended up relying on courts. "Blue Sky Laws" (as they were known, since fraudulent schemes included the sale of real estate "in the blue sky") 69 were intended to limit "speculative" investments. Some "safe" investments (such as state bonds) were explicitly listed but in other cases statutes included more ambiguous language. In Trakas v. Cokins (1922) the issue was a section of the State of Illinois' Blue Sky Law, which mentioned that among the securities that could be lawfully sold in Illinois, were "securities listed in a standard manual or in manuals approved by the Secretary of the State of Illinois." As we saw, the defendant, a broker, had been prevented by a lower court "to testify that [Moody' s Manual] was a standard manual of 1918" and the higher court found this was error so that eventually, the Illinois Blue Sky Law was relying on the agencies. In effect, however, the regulator had waited for the courts to decide what she had meant when she had mentioned "standard manuals". industry" and we fail to see the fundamental difference with today. What if the industry at large fails, which obviously has been the case in the subprime crisis and arguably was the case in the interwar crisis.
In fact, when discussing the modern failure of rating agencies few realize that it had a precedent in the agencies' "inability" to predict the 1931 bond debacle (although this interwar "failure" has been documented statistically: Braddock 1958 , Flandreau et al. 2011 . This is too short a paper to demonstrate that the legal license contributed to the interwar debacle. But we have provided some evidence supporting the view that if anyone believes in the story that the regulatory license caused the subprime crisis, then she should be prepared to consider that the legal license was a significant element of the interwar problems and as a result, that there is something deeper and more "pernicious" motives in our inextinguishable thirst for rating.
Conclusions
This paper has offered some background to the "landmark" regulatory decisions taken in According to this alternative, the 1930s indeed witnessed a dramatic shift in the replacement of court litigation (and states' Blue Sky Laws) by federal regulation. But there was substantial continuity as to the tool on which all these supervisory arrangements relied to judge financial behavior, and ascertain "investment grade." Owing to the courts' reliance on the expertise of agencies, the organizations were already entrenched in the fabric of United
States capital markets. Before the statistical organizations became "nationally recognized" by Federal supervisors, they had in fact been "recognized nationally" by US judges and this generated tensions not unlike those that have been discovered lately. In summary, there is more in the story of the rise of ratings than some bureaucratic conspiracy that would have taken the Great Depression as pretext.
This illustrates a serious policy difficulty, which legal scholars have recognized. In capitalist societies, norms may arise that the community will accept and decision-makers are naturally guided by these norms. But the problem is that adherence to such norms may cause inferior decisions and lead to perverse outcomes (Hill 2010) . The twist which our study adds to such discussion is that there is a strong demand for -in our language, an addiction tosuch norms. They are enablers: Could a market exist without its operators being provided with a liability framework? In discussing ways to handle the problem, a menu is often provided of choosing between legal and regulatory solutions. The depressing lesson from history is that these respective strategies may not be so different in the long run: We suspect that the outcome from law-based management of liability in the interwar was not so different from that of the modern regulation-based framework, with a Great Crash and a Subprime Crisis respectively arising. agency ID (restarts from 1 for every rating agency) agency code "S" for Standard Statistics, "P" for Poor's, "M" for Moody's idd combination of agency ID and agency code ("ID"-"agency code" "agency ID") case citation citation number (bibliographic reference number, as given by Westlaw) name case name rating agency rating agency name: "Standard Statistics", "Poor's", "Moody's" Apart from the unrelated cases, all the remaining ones were furthermore coded: Table A Co. v Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 52 S.Ct. 371 (1932) .
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Cases were also examined for co-quotations. Namely whenever a case quoted more than one rating agency simultaneously a note was taken. As can be seen from the table which follows, no cases, had reference to more than 2 rating agencies. 
